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From Selling Goods to Selling Services: Firm Responses  
to Trade Liberalization†
By Holger Breinlich, Anson Soderbery, and Greg C. Wright*
In this paper, we focus on a new channel of adaptation to trade lib-
eralization, namely the shift toward increased provision of services 
in lieu of goods production. We exploit variation in European Union 
trade policy to show that lower manufacturing tariffs lead firms to 
shift into services provision and out of goods production. We also 
find that a successful transition is associated with higher firm-level 
R&D stocks. (JEL D22, F13, F14, L16, L60, L80)
Domestic firms respond to trade liberalization in a number of ways. As import tariffs fall, some firms shrink and eventually exit their market altogether, 
whereas others adapt and survive. Those who survive do so in several ways. 
Recent work has shown that firms respond by increasing their innovation efforts 
(Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen 2016; Teshima 2009), by increasing the quality 
of their  products (Khandelwal 2010), by refocusing their product scope on core 
 competencies (Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano 2014; Liu 2010), or by decentralizing 
their  management  hierarchy (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2010).
In this paper, we use UK firm-level data to focus on a new channel of 
 adjustment to changes in trade policy. Namely, we demonstrate a shift toward 
increased  provision of services in lieu of goods production. An initial look at the 
data  suggests that this shift was potentially significant. Between 1997 and 2007 
UK  manufacturing import tariffs fell from an average of about 7 percent to about 
3 percent, mostly as a  consequence of the implementation of the Uruguay Round.1 
At the same time, UK  manufacturing experienced a shift toward services provision 
relative to goods  production (Figure  1). This relative decline in domestic goods 
 production was  accompanied by a leveling off of domestic production in absolute 
1 See Figure A3 in the online Appendix, available at http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~asoderbe/Papers/BSW_
Appendix.pdf. 
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terms and  happened despite the fact that overall demand for goods grew rapidly over 
the  period.2 The reorientation toward services has also been important for overall 
 activity in the manufacturing sector. For instance, the growth in services revenues 
within the manufacturing sector during this period contributed 3 percentage points 
to the manufacturing share of total UK output.3 Thus, the long-running relative 
decline of manufacturing has at least in part been slowed by manufacturing becom-
ing more services-oriented.
The shift into services production is also visible at the level of individual firms. 
Figure 2 plots the change in goods production versus the change in services  provision 
for individual firms over the period 1997–2007. The negative relationship is highly 
statistically significant and suggests that the shift toward services took place at the 
level of individual firms, and was not simply a consequence of the reallocation of 
output shares toward more service-intensive firms or sectors.4 Considered in light 
of these trends, existing UK firms seem to have been, on average, re-orienting 
 production toward services.
In this paper, we use firm-level data for the United Kingdom over the period 
 1997–2007 to further explore the link between reductions in manufacturing import 
tariffs and the firm’s tradeoff between goods production and the provision of 
 services. We find that lower tariffs are associated with a shift to greater services 
provision relative to goods production. These results are robust to controlling 
for changes in manufacturing export tariffs, changes in services trade barriers, 
firm fixed effects and a number of time-varying firm-level covariates, as well as 
2 The value of UK manufacturing output grew less than half a percent per year over the period while total UK 
goods consumption nearly doubled. See ONS (2007a). 
3 Services produced by manufacturing firms count as manufacturing output in UK national accounts statistics. 
If we remove the increase in such services sales between 1997 and 2007 from our data (described in more detail 
below), we obtain a manufacturing share of 10 percent in 2007, instead of 13 percent if services sales are included. 
4 The coefficient of the regression line in Figure 2 is −0.58 with a standard error of 0.02. 
Figure 1. Share of Services in UK Manufacturing (1997–2007)
Notes: The figure shows the ratio of services revenues to total revenues in the UK manufacturing sector over the 
period 1997 to 2007. See Section II for details on the underlying data.
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 industry-specific time trends. We also show that the relative increase in services 
provision in response to lower manufacturing tariffs is driven by both an absolute 
reduction in goods  production and, in particular, an absolute increase in services 
provision.
We discuss a number of potential mechanisms that could explain these results 
by generating a link between services and goods production within the firm. One 
possibility is that firms’ goods and services outputs may be subject to demand 
 complementarities. However, this possibility seems to be ruled out by the strong 
negative association between manufacturing and service outputs within firms. It 
is also inconsistent with the positive impact of lower goods tariffs on services, 
 conditional on several possibly confounding covariates. A second mechanism, 
which is potentially more in line with the evidence, is the possibility that UK 
firms’ relative provision of services rose due to an increase in offshoring  activity. 
In other words, UK firms might respond to goods trade liberalization by  moving 
their goods production overseas to foreign affiliates or arms length  suppliers, while 
 intensifying their focus domestically on headquarter services. In our  empirical 
analysis we find that this channel was relatively unimportant. Third, firms may 
adjust to trade  liberalization by selling industry-specific expertise that they have 
accumulated over time as goods producers, which they can subsequently sell in the 
form of services. Finally, we also consider a more traditional  Heckscher-Ohlin-type 
mechanism in which trade liberalization drives UK manufacturing firms towards 
specialization in skill-intensive services production.
We attempt to distinguish between Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms and an 
“ expertise-driven” increase in service provision by augmenting our regression 
Figure 2. Average Annual Within-Firm Growth in Goods versus Services 
Notes: The figure plots the average annual log change in goods production versus services provision within firms in 
the UK manufacturing sector over the period 1997–2007. See Section II for details on the underlying data. 
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 specification with a number of interaction terms. We interact import tariffs with 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin variables such as initial average wages (as a proxy for 
workers’ skills) and initial capital intensity, as well as with a proxy for a firm’s 
 accumulated expertise (initial R&D stocks normalized by firm sales).5 The  empirical 
results suggest a prominent role for the R&D proxy for expertise in  facilitating the 
transition to more intensive services provision in the face of goods market trade 
 liberalization. In contrast, higher capital intensity and higher  average wages are 
found to be relatively unimportant. These results are robust to  controlling for 
 additional interaction terms such as firm productivity and initial service  intensity, 
which might be correlated with R&D intensity. We interpret these findings as 
 favoring an  expertise-based mechanism, although we acknowledge that they are 
also consistent with a more sophisticated comparative advantage story in which UK 
firms’ comparative advantage is to be found in expertise-intensive (rather than skill- 
or capital-intensive) production.
Our finding that the firm’s stock of accumulated expertise is important in pro-
moting production flexibility is consistent with a strand of the management litera-
ture. For instance, Wiklund and Shepherd (2003, 1308) argue that “Knowledge about 
markets and technology  … potentially have strong performance implications because 
they increase the ability to discover and exploit opportunities.” A somewhat smaller 
literature brings these ideas closer to the context we explore here by documenting the 
“servitization” of manufacturing. Neely, Benedetinni, and Visnjic (2011) document 
global trends in servitization, finding that around the world approximately 30 percent 
of manufacturing firms with over 100 employees produce services.6 In a review of 
this literature, Baines et al. (2009) note that a particular focus of the literature is on 
service provision as “an opportunity to differentiate from products originating from 
lower cost economies,” which is in line with the question we address here. In contrast 
to this line of research, we apply a formal econometric strategy to explore a specific 
determinant of the shift to increased services provision by goods producers, namely 
trade liberalization. We show that this determinant was quantitatively important over 
our sample period, with the average tariff reduction leading to an approximate 50 
percent rise in firms’ services-to-goods ratio, compared with firms that saw no tariff 
reduction.
The paper follows a line of literature that explores the within-firm response to trade 
and trade liberalization. Several papers document the role of trade in promoting firm 
productivity growth (e.g., Pavcnik 2002; Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2006b) as well 
as innovation and technology adoption (e.g., Bloom et al. 2016, Lileeva and Trefler 
2010, or Bustos 2011). Somewhat related to this paper, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 
(2006a) show that US manufacturing firms that are more exposed to import com-
petition from low-wage countries are more likely to switch their domestic industry. 
More closely related to this paper, Bernard, Smeets, and Warzynski (2017) show 
that Danish manufacturing firms have been switching industries, toward services, 
5 The use of the R&D stock as a measure of accumulated expertise has a long history beginning with Griliches 
(1979). 
6 See also Crozet and Milet (2017), who document the servitization of French manufacturing. 
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and furthermore that for a subset of these firms R&D plays an important role in the 
transition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and provides 
 additional descriptive statistics documenting the nature of services activities carried 
out by UK manufacturing firms. Section II provides a discussion of the potential 
mechanisms at work. Section III describes our research design and specifications. 
Section IV presents the results and Section V concludes.
I. Data and Stylized Facts
A. Firm Data
The primary dataset used is the UK Annual Respondents Database (ARD), which 
contains firm-level variables over the period 1997–2007.7 The ARD is drawn from 
an underlying register of the (near) universe of UK businesses. The data consist of 
the full population of large businesses (those with more than 100 or 250 employees 
depending on the year) as well as a random sample of smaller businesses. Here we 
focus narrowly on the manufacturing sector. Firms self-report their main industry 
of activity upon registration with Companies’ House, the UK agency responsible 
for incorporating companies and maintaining a firm registry. Once registered, firms 
can (self-) report changes in their industry classification although in practice this 
 happens only rarely, even if a firm’s output mix changes substantially.8 We include 
all firms in our sample that report that their primary activity is in manufacturing in 
the first year they appear in the data, and we use their industry code in that year to 
link in our trade barrier measures (see below).9
The ARD includes many establishment-level variables and, for our purposes, the 
most relevant will be the total value of services provided by the establishment, the total 
value of services exported by the establishment, and the total value of goods produced. 
Additionally, the ARD allows us to construct the physical capital stock of each firm 
by applying the perpetual inventory method to annual firm investments in plant and 
machinery. Our labor productivity measure is also recorded in the ARD data as firm 
value added per worker and the average firm wage is the wage bill per worker.
Additionally, we augment the ARD with the International Trade in Services 
Inquiry (ITIS). The ITIS survey collects data on international transactions in ser-
vices by private sector companies resident in the United Kingdom, and is the main 
input into the trade in services account in the United Kingdom balance of pay-
ments (ONS 2007b; Breinlich and Criscuolo 2011). The ITIS covers firms with 10 
7 For a comprehensive description of this dataset, see Criscuolo, Haskel, and Martin (2003), or for a summary 
see Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011). We note that we begin our sample in 1997 because this is the first year that the 
ARD contains information about firms’ services output. 
8 Less than 1 percent of the firms in the ARD report major changes in sectoral classification (switching from 
manufacturing to services or vice versa). As a result, around 5 percent of manufacturing firms report more service 
than goods sales. This pattern seems to be even more pronounced in other countries. For example, Crozet and Milet 
(2017) reports that in 2007, 33 percent of French firms classified as manufacturing firms were selling more services 
than goods. 
9 Our results are virtually identical if we also include the small number of firms that start in services but transi-
tion into manufacturing (we use their first manufacturing industry code to link in the trade barrier data in that case). 
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or more employees and samples around 20,000 firms per year (before 2001 this was 
10,000), oversampling firms that are likely to be services traders. In contrast to the 
ARD, the ITIS asks about the types of services exported or imported, and the coun-
tries of  destination or origin of exports and imports. The ITIS distinguishes between 
38 types of services (grouped into 10 aggregate categories) and records trade with 
around 220 foreign countries and territories. We can use the ITIS to obtain an outline 
of the service export activities of manufacturing firms. Table 1 lists the types of ser-
vices exported by UK manufacturing firms along with their prevalence in the data. 
Notably, royalties and licenses and technical services are the two most common 
services exports by manufacturing firms, followed with some distance by agricul-
tural, mining, and on-site processing services, as well as business and professional 
services.10
Finally, we combine the ARD data with information on the annual R&D invest-
ments by firms, drawn from the Business Expenditure on Research and Development 
(BERD) dataset. We construct the R&D stock for each firm using the perpetual 
inventory method applied to the BERD flows, adopting an economic depreciation 
rate of 30 percent.11 Throughout, we normalize this measure by firm revenue in 
order to capture firm intensity in R&D.12
Our final dataset contains up to 45,000 individual firms depending on the 
 specification (as noted in the regression tables), covering 225 manufacturing 
 industries at the 4-digit level of the UK Standard Industrial Classification (UK SIC) 
10 Note that the ARD only contains the total value of service production (i.e., not by service type), so that we 
cannot provide a similar breakdown for overall service production. 
11 We choose this value following the convention in the literature; see, for instance, Bloom, Griffith, and 
Van Reenen (2002). However, our results are virtually unchanged for values near this. 
12 We scale the R&D stock by firm revenue in order to capture firm intensity in R&D. This is consistent with 
the idea that even small firms that are relatively R&D active may apply their accumulated expertise to services 
provision. Stated differently, we do not believe that firm size, and, hence, the absolute size of the R&D stock, is 
necessarily the key determinant of the likelihood of transition. 
Table 1—Services Types Exported by UK Manufacturing Firms 
Enterprise-years
Service type Percent Number
Royalties and licenses 38 1,890
Technical services 36 1,787
Agricultural, mining, on-site processing services 20 986
Business and professional services 18 890
Communications services 11 542
Computer and information services 8 382
Merchanting and other trade-related services 8 378
Other trade in services 3 169
Personal, cultural, and recreational services 2 86
Construction services 2 79
Insurance services 1 25
Notes: The table presents the percent and number of firm years for which we observe exports 
of each services category. Percents are calculated relative to the total number of firm-year 
observations in our regression sample, which can be matched to the ITIS (4,932 observations 
in total). Firms can export more than one service in a given year, so that percentages add up to 
more than 100 percent. See Section II for details on the underlying data.
VOL. 10 NO. 4 85BREINLICH ET AL.: FROM SELLING GOODS TO SELLING SERVICES
over the period 1997–2007.13 As noted, the sample of small firms in the ARD is a 
repeated cross section, such that small firms’ tenure in our dataset is variable and 
usually short.14 In addition, there is quite a bit of churning of firms into and out of our 
sample though the extent of the churning is stable across years. The most  important 
reason for sample exit is the sample design underlying the ARD and, in partic-
ular, the random sampling of small and medium-sized firms.15 Nevertheless, we 
discuss this issue further in our robustness checks and provide evidence that sample 
entry/exit is unlikely to be problematic for our results. For example, we show that 
our results are almost identical across subsamples that include firms with relatively 
short or relatively long tenures in our dataset. We also present results for attrition 
probability regressions, which show that the probability of actual exit (as opposed to 
exit from the sample) in response to tariff cuts is not higher for firms with initially 
lower service shares.16
13 In specifications that include the R&D stock variable, the number of firms is reduced due to the smaller sam-
ple of firms drawn for the BERD. 
14 Online Appendix Table A2 documents the number of firms in our dataset by tenure, where we see that indeed 
the most common tenure is one year. 
15 See Partington (2001) for details. As discussed, larger firms are always sampled. Medium-sized enterprises 
(between 10 and 100 to 250 employees) are rotated out of the sample at a rate of 50 percent per year, meaning 
that half the businesses that are in the survey in year one are also included for year two. Smaller businesses are 
usually only included for one year, meaning that the exit rate for such firms is 100 percent. Using these re-sampling 
probabilities by size band together with the number of firms in each band yields an average resampling-induced 
exit probability of around 45 percent. As a consistency check, we have also computed an indicator for true firm exit 
(as opposed to exit from the ARD sample) using the UK’s firm register (the BSD) from which the ARD sample 
is drawn. This shows that the average true exit probability for the firms that appear in our sample at some point is 
indeed only around 4.5 percent per year, again suggesting that only a small part of the sample exit rate of 49-51 
percent reported in Table 2 is due to true exit. 
16 In online Appendix Table A3, we further document for each two-digit industry the average number of firms 
and average industry sales over 1997–2007. 
Table 2—Firm Entry and Exit 
Entrants Exiters Stayers
Year Firms Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent
1997 11,086 11,086 100 5,453 49 – –
1998 11,386 5,753 51 5,621 49 3,737 33
1999 11,161 5,396 48 5,568 50 3,164 28
2000 10,974 5,381 49 5,482 50 3,196 29
2001 11,457 5,965 52 5,812 51 3,082 27
2002 10,541 4,896 46 5,226 50 3,280 31
2003 10,307 4,992 48 5,013 49 3,151 31
2004 10,020 4,726 47 5,064 51 3,019 30
2005 9,417 4,461 47 5,035 53 2,596 28
2006 8,587 4,205 49 4,171 49 2,602 30
2007 9,448 5,032 53 9,448 100 – –
Notes: The total number of firms in the full data are reported along with their persistence in the sample. Entrants 
are firms that were not in the sample in the prior period but are in the sample in the current period. Exiters are firms 
that are in the sample in the current period but are not in the sample in the following period. Stayers are firms that 
are in the sample in the prior, current, and following period. The percent is the percentage of total firms in each 
category—a firm only present in the current period will be both an exiter and an entrant so our fractions need not 
sum to 100 percent. 
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B. Trade Barrier Data
Import tariffs ( τ  jtG M ) for each industry and year in our sample are collected from 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Tariff Database. We focus on Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) tariffs, which do not vary across WTO member countries. We aggre-
gate tariff line information to the 4-digit UK SIC level using concordances provided 
by the United Nations Statistics Division and taking simple averages across tariff 
lines. Note that changes in MFN tariffs were the most important source of variation 
during our sample period in the European Union’s (EU) (and hence the UK’s) exter-
nal tariff, in the sense that they applied to imports from all other WTO members, 
covering almost all of the UK’s imports from outside the EU. The EU also nego-
tiated a number of free trade agreements between 1997 and 2007 but these were 
with smaller trading partners which accounted for only a small share of the UK’s 
non-EU trade.17 While average MFN import tariffs were already relatively low in 
1997 (around 5 percent), this average hides substantial sectoral heterogeneity. In 
1997, ad-valorem tariffs ranged from 0 percent to over 40 percent in some sectors. 
By 2007, average tariff levels had halved to around 2.5 percent and the highest tar-
iffs to just over 20 percent, implying tariff reductions of up to 20 percentage points.
Our empirical strategy also requires average goods export tariffs ( τ  jtG X ) faced 
by UK firms in foreign destinations. These come from the United Nations’ Trade 
Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) as cleaned and expanded by Feenstra 
and Romalis (2014).18 We aggregate these product-destination-year specific tariffs 
in two steps. First, using a concordance between SITC and UK SIC provided by the 
United Nations Statistics Division, we construct destination-specific export tariffs 
at the UK SIC 4-digit level by taking simple averages across the SITC tariff lines 
mapping into a given UK SIC code. We then aggregate across destination countries 
using average trade shares of each destination country in total UK exports between 
1994–1996. The resulting average ad valorem tariff varies at the year and 4-digit 
SIC-level, and captures the average goods export barriers faced by UK manufactur-
ing firms in a given industry and year.19
In one of our robustness checks we also control for intermediate input tariffs for 
goods which we compute as the weighted average of the UK import tariffs of all 
industries  k supplying a given industry  j :
  Input tariff jt =  ∑ 
k
  w kj ×  τ  ktG M ,
where  τ ktG  M is industry k’s goods import tariff (described above) and  w kj is the cost 
share of industry  k in the production of goods in industry  j in 1995. We obtain 
17 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/index_en.htm for a list of EU trade 
agreements. Importantly, MFN tariffs applied to all of the UK’s major non-EU trading partners, such as the United 
States, Japan, and China. (China had been granted most-favored nation status by the EU in 1985, long before its 
eventual WTO accession in 2001.) 
18 We thank John Romalis for making these data available to us. 
19 We use simple averages or pre-period weights to avoid or reduce endogeneity problems arising from the use 
of contemporary trade weights (that are themselves a function of tariffs). 
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information on  w kj from the UK Input-Output Analytical Table for 1995 (Office of 
National Statistics 2002).
For measures of services trade barriers ( τ  jtS M and  τ  jtS X ), we rely on the OECD’s 
Product Market Regulation (PMR) index, which quantifies barriers to services trade 
in different service types for OECD and selected third countries.20 Unfortunately, 
there is no existing concordance between these service types and UK SIC indus-
tries. Thus, in a first step we need to determine the service types that correspond 
to each SIC industry. To do this, we focus on the service types that are imported 
and exported by firms in a particular SIC industry, obtained from the UK ITIS. For 
imports, we compute the share of each service type imported by the firms in a given 
sector in the total service imports of these firms. We then use these shares as weights 
to aggregate the service-type specific trade barriers from the PMR to obtain UK 
SIC-specific import barriers.21 For exports, we first compute service-type weights 
in a similar manner and calculate destination-industry-specific export barriers by 
combining the weights and the service-specific barriers for each foreign country 
reported by the OECD PMR index. Similar to goods export tariffs, in a final step we 
aggregate across all foreign countries using the share of each country in total UK 
services exports between 1994–1996.
Note that for most of our analysis, our focus will be on the effect of import tariffs 
on the relative mix of service and goods production, controlling for the other trade 
barriers just discussed. Tariffs have a number of important advantages over other 
measures of the intensity of import competition. Most importantly, they are under 
the direct control of policy makers, rather than being determined by a complex array 
of additional general equilibrium forces, as is the case for import penetration ratios. 
As such, understanding the impact of tariff changes on service intensity is of much 
more direct policy relevance.22
Second, tariffs are arguably more exogeneous than general equilibrium outcomes 
such as imports. This is particularly true in our setting, given that both manufac-
turing import and export tariffs are negotiated by the European Commission for 
the European Union as a whole, making them less likely to be endogenous to UK 
industrial trends. Also note that in contrast to regional trade agreements, MFN tar-
iff changes are the result of multilateral negotiations involving a large number of 
countries, making it more difficult for individual firms or sectors to influence their 
outcome. Indeed, this is another important reason for why we focus on MFN tariffs. 
Services trade barriers are more heterogeneous and still more influenced by national 
policies. But even here, bilateral negotiations with other countries and trading 
blocks fell within the remit of the European Commission for the second half of our 
sample period, and services barriers were brought into the remit of the World Trade 
20 These data are available at www.oecd.org/economy/growth/. 
21 We use the first year in our sample (1997) to construct these weights in order to reduce endogeneity problems. 
Unfortunately, no firm-level service import data is available prior to 1997, so that we cannot use pre-sample weights 
as for our goods export tariffs. Note that constructing weights at the industry rather than the firm level helps reduce 
endogeneity problems from using trade-based weights. 
22 See, for instance, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) and Trefler (2004) for a discussion of this point and a criti-
cism of more indirect measures such as import penetration ratios. In any case, below we demonstrate that regressing 
service shares on import penetration ratios instead of import tariff yields qualitatively similar results. 
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Organization as part of the Uruguay Round.23 We return to this issue in Section IV 
below where we report additional econometric evidence for the exogeneity of tariff 
reductions and discuss potential remaining issues. In Section IV, we also show that 
our results are robust to using (likely endogenous) import penetration ratios instead 
of import tariffs.
C. Stylized Facts
This section presents basic descriptive statistics on the provision of services by 
UK manufacturing firms. To begin, we restate two findings presented in the intro-
duction. Figure 1 documents the share of services revenues in total revenues across 
all UK firms between 1997 and 2007. We see that since 1997 the fraction of service 
activity within manufacturing firms has grown steadily, reaching 20 percent in 2007. 
Figure 2 then plots the average annual change in services revenue over the period 
against the change in goods revenue for each firm in the sample. The fitted line indi-
cates that, on average, goods and services are substitutes within the firm.24
Focusing in more detail on the evolution of services provision within UK firms, 
Table 3 provides further information on the evolution of manufacturing firms’ services 
shares and a number of firm-level covariates (average wages, capital and R&D stocks, 
and total revenues). Specifically, we regress the annual percentage point change in the 
share of services in total output (i.e.,  shar e t − shar e t−1 ) on firm-level variables mea-
sured at the beginning of the period (i.e., at  t − 1 ). As seen, higher initial wages, R&D 
stocks, and total output are associated with a stronger shift into services, whereas the 
23 The European Commission obtained explicit powers to negotiate services trade policy in addition to goods 
trade policy in the Treaty of Nice (2001). Trade policy in services is restricted by the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) of 1995, although it is still unclear to what extent the Uruguay Round triggered a liberalization 
of services trade in addition to goods trade (see Francois and Hoekman 2010). 
24 The coefficient of the regression line in Figure 2 is −0.58 with a standard error of 0.02. 
Table 3—Change in Services Share and Beginning-of-Period Firm-Level Covariates 
 Δ Ratio of services/goods revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(initial average wage) 0.00093 −0.00175
(0.00050) (0.00142)
log(initial R&D) 0.00091 0.00099 
(0.00027) (0.00031)
log(initial capital stock) −0.00013 −0.00051
(0.00016) (0.00036)
log(initial total revenue) 0.00042 0.00014
(0.00012) (0.00041)
Observations 60,880 15,346 64,160 64,160 14,644
Firms 22,430 5,007 23,166 23,166 4,895
R2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes: The table presents results for regressions of the annual percentage-point change in the share of services in 
total revenue (denoted  Δ Ratio of Services/Goods Revenue) on the firm-level variables listed in the first column. 
Firm-level variables are measured at the beginning of the period over which the change in the dependent variable is 
calculated. See Section II for details on the underlying data. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and 
are in parentheses.
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initial capital stock is negatively (though insignificantly) correlated with the change in 
the services share. Interestingly, when we include all four determinants jointly, only 
the coefficient on initial R&D stocks remains positive and significant.
II. Mechanisms
Here we highlight potential theoretical channels through which trade liberaliza-
tion may affect relative goods output and services provision at the level of the firm 
over time. First, it may simply be the case that a firm’s goods and services outputs 
are complements on the demand side. For example, a firm may produce a product 
that requires some level of ongoing support, such as a manufacturer who provides 
regular service on their product for some period after purchase. In this case we 
would observe a strong, positive relationship between the level of goods and ser-
vices output at the firm level, and a simultaneous reduction in both output types in 
the face of trade liberalization. However, in light of the fact that we find a strong, 
negative correlation between goods and services production within firms, we rule 
this out as a potential explanation for our results.
We focus instead on three alternative channels. First, a Heckscher-Ohlin mecha-
nism in which increased global engagement by low-skill abundant developing coun-
tries alters global production patterns may have impacted the relative provision of 
services across UK firms. More specifically, from the UK perspective increased 
firm specialization according to comparative advantage would lead to a shift toward 
greater skill-intensive production, particularly within industries that are overall 
skill-intensive (see Crozet and Trionfetti 2013, for a model of firm-level compar-
ative advantage).25 Since many UK manufacturing industries are likely to be rel-
atively skill intensive, this comparative advantage mechanism may manifest as an 
on-average, firm-level shift toward increased use of skill, which may correlate with 
an increase in relative services provision to the extent that services are  skill inten-
sive. We return to this prediction in Section IVC.
Second, import competition in the goods market may lead to increased offshoring 
of goods production by UK firms. There is, of course, a large literature exploring 
the decision by multinational firms to increasingly locate headquarters services in 
human capital-rich developed countries while offshoring low-skill-intensive aspects 
of the production process to developing countries.26 By focusing narrowly on a 
firm’s activities within a single country (as we do) one may mistakenly attribute 
increased offshoring to an overall decline in goods production by firms. This may 
lead to an observed relative rise in the services share for all firms, and particularly 
for initially low-skill intensive firms that have the greatest incentive to engage in 
offshoring (see Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008 or Wright 2014). With respect 
to this potential channel, we can test directly for an offshoring response to trade 
liberalization, and we do so in Section IVB.
25 Crozet and Trionfetti (2013) shows that firms that are intensive in the factor used intensively in their industry 
and of which their country is relatively well endowed have a comparative advantage over firms with identical factor 
intensity in other countries. 
26 See Crinó (2009) for a review of this literature. 
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Finally, a shift toward increased relative provision of services may reflect a shift 
toward sales of accumulated expertise by UK firms. In other words, over time firms 
may accumulate industry- and product-specific expertise as a byproduct of their 
research, development, and production of goods, and this expertise may be embod-
ied by workers within the firm. When confronted with increased competition in the 
goods market, firms may then leverage this knowledge in the market for services. 
In effect, the firms can sell their accumulated market-specific expertise in lieu of 
goods. However, since the knowledge is embodied, the switch to services will come 
at the expense of goods production. One version of this mechanism is explored by 
Bloom et al. (2012). In their “trapped factors” model the opportunity cost of produc-
ing services (in their case the focus is on the opportunity cost of innovation, but the 
model’s mechanism is not specific to this case) falls in the face of increased import 
competition in goods due to the fact that there are adjustment costs associated with 
moving factors out of one output type and into another. Alternatively, in the online 
Appendix, we present a similar model in which firm-specific expertise is rival in 
its use across output types (goods or services) but where larger stocks of expertise 
reduce the magnitude of the rivalry, thereby making it easier for the firm to transition 
out of one output type and into another. In both cases it is an increase in the relative 
profitability of services due to a rise in import competition in the goods market that 
induces the transition. In this case there are two primary empirical predictions that 
would be observable in our data. First, the switch to services provision may again be 
relatively pronounced among low-skill-intensive firms as skilled workers are brought 
onboard to a greater extent among these most affected firms, a prediction that is 
difficult to distinguish from the more straightforward Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism 
described above. However, a second prediction is that the shift toward an increased 
services provision should be greater within firms that ex ante perform more R&D (a 
proxy for expertise), and we explicitly test this hypothesis in Section IVC.
In sum, each of these channels may lead to a within-firm shift toward a more 
skilled workforce, which we will proxy with the firm’s average wage.27 However, 
beyond this, the second channel predicts an increase in offshoring. To explore this 
channel, we focus on the fact that offshoring is typically associated with an increase 
in exports of headquarters services, which we can observe. Finally, the third channel 
predicts a rise in R&D intensity within the firm, and we explore this channel by 
exploiting available R&D data. We keep these implications in mind and refer back 
to them in the empirics.
III. Empirical Approach
In this section, we explore the magnitude of the within-firm response to trade 
 liberalization. Specifically, we estimate specifications relating the ratio of a 
firm’s revenues from services relative to goods ( R ijtS / R ijtG ) to reductions in MFN 
import  tariffs. We also include a number of additional firm- and sector-level  controls 
to further reduce the threat of omitted variable bias and to increase the precision of 
27 Unfortunately, the ARD does not contain information on skill levels, so we cannot use a more direct proxy. 
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our estimates. At the sectoral level, we control for variation in the other three trade 
barriers affecting UK firms i.e., UK import and export barriers for services trade, 
as well as the export tariffs faced by goods producers. Variation in any of these 
trade barriers will clearly have a direct impact on the optimal choice of production 
of goods relative to services, and we therefore want to control for these potential 
determinants of relative output. At the level of individual firms, we control for 
the average wage bill, as a proxy for input prices and the skill level of the work 
force, and labor productivity, as a proxy for firm-specific  productivity shocks.28 In 
 addition, we include year fixed effects, which will capture any  macro-level trends in 
input prices and technologies; and in our preferred specifications, we add firm fixed 
effects and two-digit industry time trends to control for  firm-specific,  time-invariant 
factors and productivity trends, as well as trends in aggregate  expenditure on each 
industry’s output.
Finally, we note that our baseline specification, while formally atheoretical, 
is consistent with the equilibrium ratio of services to goods output implied by a 
straightforward monopolistic competition model, an example of which we present 
in the online Appendix.
These considerations lead us to the following reduced-form specification  relating 
the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services relative to goods ( R ijtS / R ijtG ) to the 
 channels discussed above:
(1)   R ijtS  _ R ijtG  = exp [ η i +  θ t +  β 1  τ  jtG 
M +  β 2  τ  jtG X +  β 3  τ  jtS M 
 +  β 4  τ  jtS X +  β 5 ln w – ijt +  β 6 ln  ψ ijt +  ρ m t] +  ϵ ijt ,
where the  τ s represent import ( M ) and export ( X ) barriers for goods ( G ) and ser-
vices ( S ) associated with firm  i ’s industry  j . Firm and year fixed effects are denoted 
by  η i and  θ t , respectively. The firm’s average wage and labor productivity are  w – ijt 
and  ψ ijt , and  ρ m t is a 2-digit industry time trend. The main coefficient of interest 
is on goods import tariffs,  β 1 , since its sign indicates whether firms react to tariff 
reductions by increasing services output relative to goods output ( β 1 < 0 ) or by 
reducing it ( β 1 > 0 ). While our main interest is in the output of services relative to 
goods, we also estimate versions of (1) in which we use goods or services revenues 
separately as the dependent variable. This allows us to evaluate whether changes in 
relative revenues are driven by goods, services, or both.29
We have chosen an exponential conditional mean function for our baseline spec-
ifications, which we estimate via Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
techniques. The use of PPML estimation is motivated by two specific features of our 
data. First, there are many zeros for the value of services revenue, i.e., the majority 
28 We acknowledge that wages and productivity are potentially endogenous. As we show below, excluding them 
does not affect our results. 
29 Note that we use contemporaneous variation in tariffs rather than lags or leads. On the one hand, it may take 
time to expand services production relative to good production. On the other hand, the tariff reductions agreed to in 
the Uruguay round were phased in over several years and the reduction schedule was widely publicized. Thus, UK 
firms would have been aware of the timing of tariff cuts and might have started the shift into services production 
before the actual reductions took place. Using contemporaneous variation strikes a balance between these opposing 
arguments and also maximizes our sample size. 
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of firms in our data do not provide services.30 A log-linear specification would thus 
need to drop a large part of the sample. Second, given the highly skewed distribution 
of revenues across firms it is unlikely that the unexplained variation in (1), or its 
counterparts with goods and services revenues only, will be homoskedastic. As Silva 
and Tenreyro (2006) point out, the log of the error term will then be correlated with 
the regressors, due to the mechanical correlation between the mean and variance of 
a logged variable. PPML estimation addresses both of these issues and, importantly, 
seems to be a superior estimator relative to alternatives such as Tobit or Gamma 
PML (see Silva and Tenreyro 2006 or Head and Mayer 2014).31 Throughout, we 
cluster standard errors at the 4-digit industry level because our regressor of interest 
( τ jtG M ) only varies by 4-digit industry and year.
In an additional set of specifications, we interact a number of firm-level variables 
with goods import tariffs in order to explore the underlying features that are pre-
dictive of a successful transition toward greater relative provision of services in the 
face of trade liberalization. This will also be helpful in discriminating between the 
remaining mechanisms discussed in Section II (Heckscher-Ohlin versus accumu-
lated expertise). Specifically, we look at the role of firm intensity in skill, firm inten-
sity in capital, and the firm’s accumulated expertise. To do this we proxy the average 
skill level of the firm with the average firm wage in the first year we observe a firm 
in our data.32 We also exploit data on the firm’s initial period capital stock and the 
firm’s initial R&D stock (both normalized by total firm revenues) in order to proxy 
for capital intensity and firm expertise, respectively. We focus on these time-invari-
ant measures in order to mitigate the potential endogeneity between our dependent 
variable and each of these variables over the period. Finally, we add terms that inter-
act the firm’s initial labor productivity and initial level of services provision with 
goods tariffs, since these may be correlated with a firm’s overall capacity to provide 
services.33 Formally, we estimate versions of the following specification:34
(2)   R ijtS  _ R ijtG  = exp [ η i +  θ t +  α 1 (ln R& D ij ×  τ  jtG 
M ) +  α 2 (lnCa p ij ×  τ  jtG M )
 +  α 3 (ln  ψ ij ×  τ  jtG M ) +  α 4 (ln  w – ij ×  τ  jtG M ) 
 +  α 5 (ln InitSer v ij ×  τ  jtG M ) +  α 6  τ  jtG M +  α 7  τ  jtG X 
 +  α 8  τ  jtS M +  α 9  τ  jtS X +  α 10 ln  w – ijt +  α 11 ln  ψ ijt +  ρ m t ] +  ε ijt ,
30 In our baseline specification (see Table 4), 70 percent of firm-year observations for service revenues and the 
ratio of services to goods revenues are zero. 
31 Note that the coefficient on goods tariffs ( β 1 ) measures a semi-elasticity as can be verified by differentiating (1) with respect to  τ  jtG M . The corresponding OLS specification (which would produce biased estimates) would be a 
regression of the log of  R ijtS / R ijtG on the tariff variable. As a simple illustrative exercise to show that  log ( R ijtS / R ijtG ) 
is not dominated by outliers, we plot its distribution in the online Appendix, Figure A1, though again we note that 
taking the log leads to a large amount of zeros being dropped. 
32 Unfortunately, the ARD does not contain information on more direct proxies for skill intensity, such as edu-
cation levels or the share of white-collar workers. 
33 Labor productivity might play a role if the transition into services production requires a fixed cost investment. 
This investment would only be profitable for more productive firms, and we should observe a stronger shift into 
services for such firms in response to the tariff reductions. 
34 Note that the main effects of the initial firm-specific variables are subsumed in the firm fixed effects. 
VOL. 10 NO. 4 93BREINLICH ET AL.: FROM SELLING GOODS TO SELLING SERVICES
where  R& D ij and  Ca p ij denote a firm’s initial R&D and capital stock,  ψ ij and 
 w – ij its initial productivity and average wage, and  InitSer v ij its initial service share. 
All remaining regressors are as in specification (1). We are particularly interested in 
the interaction term coefficients  α 1 ,  α 2 ,  α 3 ,  α 4 , and  α 5 .
IV. Empirical Results
In this section, we present our empirical results. We first show that lower manu-
facturing import tariffs were associated with increased services provision relative to 
goods production on average. We then explore the robustness of our results and ana-
lyze the firm characteristics that influence the extent of the transition into services.
A. Firm Response to Trade Liberalization
Baseline Results.—Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1). In 
column 1, we include only the import barriers for goods and services as well as year 
fixed effects. Columns 2–7 add additional regressors and fixed effects that progres-
sively make the specifications more restrictive. In column 2, we add export barriers 
for goods and services, column 3 adds firm-level wages and labor productivity, and 
in column 4, we control for 4-digit industry fixed effects. Finally, columns 5–7 add 
firm fixed effects, where columns 5 and 6 compare the estimates with and without 
the potentially endogenous firm average wage and productivity controls, while col-
umn 7 adds two-digit industry time trends.
Table 4—Baseline Results
Ratio of service/goods revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Goods import tariffs −0.916 −0.893 −0.859 − 0.141 − 0.184 − 0.209 −0.217
(0.306) (0.329) (0.328) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066)
Goods export tariffs −0.148 −0.147 0.010 −0.038 −0.052 −0.051
(0.132) (0.125) (0.139) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
Services export barriers 0.129 0.140 2.701 0.015 0.040 0.119
(0.142) (0.134) (1.274) (0.090) (0.086) (0.092)
Services import barriers 0.945 1.115 0.971 4.207 −0.625 −0.210 −0.835
(0.611) (0.597) (0.577) (4.469) (1.118) (1.047) (1.248)
log(labor productivity) 0.114 −0.005 −0.275 −0.272
(0.239) (0.204) (0.228) (0.227)
log(average wage) 0.146 −0.017 0.957 0.954
(0.067) (0.094) (0.359) (0.359)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time trends No No No No No No Yes
Observations 109,598 107,073 97,502 97,502 60,416 54,905 54,905
Number of firms 46,164 45,232 40,948 40,948 15,525 14,284 14,284
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods on industry tar-
iffs, the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. Time trends are 
two-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses.
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS)
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Throughout Table 4, the coefficient on our main variable of interest (manufac-
turing import tariffs) is negative and highly statistically significant, indicating that 
lower import tariffs are associated with higher services revenues relative to goods 
revenues. This suggests that, at least on average, firms shift toward increased pro-
vision of services in the face of falling import barriers. We further note that the 
inclusion or exclusion of (potentially endogenous) wage and productivity controls 
has little effect on the estimates. Finally, controlling for industry or firm fixed effects 
leads to a steep fall in the coefficient on goods tariffs, suggesting that there is a sig-
nificant amount of unobserved heterogeneity across firms and industries that is cor-
related with tariff reductions. The fact that coefficient estimates also change (albeit 
less) when industry fixed effects are replaced with firm fixed effects further implies 
that unobserved within-industry heterogeneity might also be a problem. By contrast, 
including industry-time trends leaves coefficient estimates basically unchanged. 
We thus consider our firm fixed effects regressions (with or without industry-time 
trends) to be the most reliable specifications and focus on them for most of the sub-
sequent discussion and results.35,36
We next explore whether the shift to greater relative services provision is due to 
higher services revenues, lower goods revenues or a combination of both. Tables 5 
and 6 are similar to those in Table 4, but replace relative revenues by services and 
goods revenues, respectively. We see that lower manufacturing import tariffs led 
to both higher services revenues and lower goods revenues.37 The results are most 
significant for services revenues, where we find a negative and highly significant 
coefficient on goods import tariffs in all but column 4. For goods, the results are 
slightly less robust, but the relevant coefficient is also either positive and signifi-
cant or insignificant, indicating that lower manufacturing import tariffs did decrease 
goods revenues, or at least did not increase them.
Economic Significance.—We now look more closely at the economic significance 
of our baseline estimation. A first approach is to compare the magnitudes implied by 
our coefficient estimates to the actual shift into services observed during our sam-
ple period. According to our preferred specifications (columns 5–7 in Table 4), a 1 
percentage point reduction in goods import tariffs led to an approximate increase of 
18–22 percent in the ratio of services to goods revenues. Over the period 1997–2007, 
goods import tariffs declined by 2.5 percentage points on average across industries. 
35 Note that the number of observations drops sharply when we include firm fixed effects. This is because firms 
with only one year of tenure in the data and firms whose service-to-goods ratio does not change over time do not 
contribute to the Poisson likelihood function and are dropped from the data (see Cameron and Trivedi 1998). In the 
Appendix, we replicate results for columns 1–4 for the smaller sample used for the firm fixed effects regressions. 
The results are almost identical to column 1–4 in Table 4, demonstrating that the change in coefficient estimates is 
due to the inclusion of firm fixed effects rather than changes in sample composition. 
36 In contrast to goods import tariffs, results for our remaining trade barrier measures (goods export tariffs and 
services import and export barriers) are less consistent across columns and are mostly insignificant. One explana-
tion for this is that they are much less precisely measured than import tariffs. Export tariffs are a trade-weighted 
average across the import tariffs imposed by foreign countries, so that the same measure applies to different UK 
firms in the same industry, irrespective of their actual export patterns. For services, an additional problem is that 
services barriers are much harder to measure. In contrast to goods trade, where tariffs provide a simple and easily 
quantifiable restrictiveness measure, barriers for services include a wide range of regulatory and policy instruments. 
37 In unreported results (available on request), we find that the effect on total sales (goods plus services) is close 
to zero and not statistically significant for most specifications, including our preferred ones with firm fixed effects. 
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Table 5—Services Revenues as Dependent Variable
Services revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Goods import tariffs − 0.597 − 0.478 − 0.319 − 0.013 − 0.025 − 0.024 − 0.026
(0.227) (0.212) (0.167) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Goods export tariffs  − 0.275 − 0.154 0.015 − 0.116 − 0.093 − 0.095
 (0.253) (0.123) (0.071) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047)
Services export barriers  − 0.720 − 0.160 0.082 0.133 0.113 0.133
 (1.513) (0.429) (0.095) (0.099) (0.082) (0.082)
Services import barriers 2.526 2.598 2.551 4.281 0.499 0.632 0.711
(0.823) (1.009) (0.742) (1.323) (0.597) (0.426) (0.450)
log(labor productivity)   0.429 0.522  0.206 0.193
  (0.176) (0.193)  (0.070) (0.069)
log(average wage)   1.177 0.977  0.403 0.395
  (0.081) (0.039)  (0.137) (0.135)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time trends No No No No No No Yes
Observations 114,006 111,436 101,383 101,383 58,192 56,782 56,782
Number of firms 47,919 46,937 42,480 42,480 15,939 14,709 14,709
Notes: PPML regressions of the firm’s revenues from services on industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and 
the log average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. Time trends are two-digit UK SIC industry time 
trends. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses. 
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS)
Table 6—Goods Revenues as Dependent Variable
Goods revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Goods import tariffs 0.059 0.023 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.000 − 0.002
(0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Goods export tariffs  0.079 0.029 0.011 − 0.002 0.003 0.003
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.091) (0.005) (0.006)
Services export barriers  − 0.006 0.011 − 0.033 − 0.022 − 0.023 − 0.025
 (0.062) (0.042) (0.019) (0.051) (0.015) (0.014)
Services import barriers 0.373 0.322 0.105 0.015 0.141 0.111 0.099
(0.221) (0.228) (0.104) (0.233) (0.053) (0.045) (0.046)
log(labor productivity)   0.316 0.352  0.170 0.168
  (0.055) (0.045)  (0.026) (0.023)
log(average wage)   0.978 0.956  0.700 0.699
  (0.026) (0.015)  (0.031) (0.031)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time trends No No No No No No Yes
Observations 113,127 110,557 100,608 100,608 81,277 78,983 78,983
Number of firms 47,594 46,648 42,199 42,199 23,024 21,128 21,128
Notes: PPML regressions of the firm’s revenues from goods on industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and the 
log average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. Time trends are two-digit UK SIC industry time trends. 
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses. 
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS)
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This implies that the services to goods ratio increased by around 45–55 percent in 
the average industry compared to an industry that saw no tariff reductions at all. For 
comparison, the (unweighted) mean of the services-to-goods ratio across the firms 
in our sample doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent between 1997and 2007.38
An alternative way of highlighting the importance of the predicted increase in 
services production is to look at associations with other variables of interest, such 
as wages or employment. In Table 7 we regress a number of firm-level variables on 
the service-to-goods production ratio. The results show that a 1 percent increase in 
the service-to-goods ratio is associated with an approximate 0.08 percent increase 
in firm-level total sales, a 0.028 percent increase in wages, a 0.092 percent increase 
in employment, and a 0.024 percent increase in labor productivity. (We do not find 
a  statistically significant association with firm exit probabilities.) Recall our  earlier 
 prediction that the service-to-goods ratio increased by around 50 percent in an  industry 
with average tariff reductions compared to an industry without tariff  reductions. We 
can use this figure together with the above correlations to compute implied changes in 
relative firm-level outcomes. For example, according to our estimates, the 50  percent 
relative increase in the service ratio linked to tariff reductions is  associated with a 
500.09 = 4.58 percent increase in firm-level employment in the average industry 
compared to an industry without tariff reductions. The last row of Table 7 reports 
similar implied changes for the other variables as well. Of course, we caution that 
these calculations are based on simple correlations and that no causal link is implied.
B. Robustness Checks
Estimation Method and Functional Form.—We first look at the importance of 
functional forms, data construction, and estimation method on our results. In Table 8, 
the dependent variable is the service intensity of the firm, i.e., the share of services 
in total (services plus goods) output, rather than simply the ratio of the two output 
types. While the coefficient magnitudes are not directly comparable to Table 4, we 
38 Note that these figures are not directly comparable to Figure 1 because they are not size-weighted, are based 
on a slightly different sample, and the denominator is different (goods revenues in this section, total revenues in 
Figure 1). 
Table 7—Relating Services Relative to Goods Sales with Firm Outcomes
Total  
sales
Average  
wage
Employment 
ARD
Labor 
productivity
5-year exit 
rate
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(ratio service/goods production) 0.080 0.028 0.092 0.024 0.001
(0.029) (0.003) (0.023) (0.004) (0.003)
Predicted effect of a 1%  
 tariff reduction
3.99% 1.38% 4.61% 1.20% 0.00%
Observations 48,638 43,324 43,533 43,533 48,638
Notes: Year and firm fixed effects included. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses.
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD)
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see that the estimates are qualitatively similar and the coefficient on goods tariffs 
continues to be negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In Table 9, 
we estimate our baseline specification via OLS. Note that the functional form is 
again different from the baseline—we cannot take logs of the dependent variable 
because of the presence of zeros and instead regress the ratio of services to goods 
revenues on the same regressors as before.39 While OLS is likely to be biased for the 
reasons discussed above, it is reassuring to see that the results are qualitatively sim-
ilar: increased trade liberalization is associated with a rise in the relative provision 
of services. Note that for conciseness, we focus on our two preferred specifications 
here and for each of the following robustness checks (firm fixed effects and firm 
fixed effects and industry trends, respectively; i.e., those corresponding to columns 
6 and 7 from Table 4).
Import Penetration Ratios.—Table 10 presents results using sectoral import 
 penetration ratios instead of goods tariffs as our main regressor of interest. As we have 
argued above, import penetration ratios are of lesser interest to policy makers and 
are more likely to suffer from endogeneity problems. Nevertheless, it is  reassuring 
39 Our earlier PPML estimates assume an exponential conditional mean function, i.e.,  E (y) = exp (Xβ) so that β estimates a semi-elasticity. 
Table 8—Baseline Robustness—Ratio of Service to Total Revenue 
Ratio of service/  
(goods + service) revenue
Variables (1) (2)
Goods import tariffs − 0.028 − 0.030
(0.009) (0.009)
Goods export tariffs − 0.036 − 0.034
(0.013) (0.014)
Services export barriers − 0.003 0.030
(0.044) (0.041)
Services import barriers 0.381 0.356
(0.254) (0.255)
log(labor productivity) − 0.019 − 0.022
(0.041) (0.040)
log(average wage) − 0.128 − 0.123
(0.071) (0.069)
Year FEs Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes
Time trends No Yes
Observations 55,590 55,590
Number of firms 14,466 14,466
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from 
goods on industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FE indicates 
fixed effects in the model. Time trends are two-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Standard 
errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses.
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services 
Inquiry (ITIS)
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to see that we obtain qualitatively similar results when using this  alternative measure 
of import competition. As seen in Table 10, higher import penetration has a positive 
and significant impact on the service-to-goods ratio, with a one percentage point 
increase in import penetration raising relative service production by approximately 
1.4 percent.
Focus on Domestic Sales.—The ratio of services to goods revenues, which is the 
focus of the baseline specification (1), includes exports as well as domestic sales. 
Export revenues from any location  n will depend on trade barriers imposed by that 
location on the exports of firm  i (proxied by  τ  jtG X and  τ  jtS X in specification (1)) but 
also on the barriers imposed on firms from third markets. Unfortunately, we do not 
have data for such third-market trade barriers and multi-collinearity issues would 
prevent their inclusion in any case. As a simple robustness check we focus instead 
on  domestic revenues in the construction of our dependent variable, rather than 
total  revenues (which also include export revenues). That is, we  construct  domestic 
services  revenues ( R ijtS DOM ) as total services revenues minus services exports. 
Unfortunately, for our sample period the ARD only contains data on export reve-
nues for services but not for goods. Thus, we continue to use total goods revenues as 
the denominator of our dependent variable. For comparison with our earlier results 
from Table 4, we also estimate a specification with  R ijtS 
DOM as the dependent variable.
In Table 11 (columns 1–2), we regress the newly constructed revenue ratio 
( R ijtS DOM / R ijtG ) on the same variables as in our baseline specification. The results are 
Table 9—Baseline Robustness—OLS
Ratio of service/goods revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Goods import tariffs − 0.027 − 0.021 − 0.020 − 0.004 − 0.012 −0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Goods export tariffs  − 0.019 − 0.019 0.007 − 0.005 − 0.007
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014)
Services export barriers  0.003 0.004 0.065 0.001 0.001
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.083) (0.002) (0.033)
Services import barriers 0.107 0.112 0.107 0.446 0.027 0.020
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.354) (0.031) (0.104)
log(labor productivity)   0.020 0.004 − 0.019 − 0.019 
  (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025)
log(average wage)   0.022 − 0.002 0.064 0.064
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.034) (0.036)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No Yes No No
Firm FEs No No No No Yes Yes
Time trends No No No No No Yes
Observations 109,598 107,073 97,502 97,502 79,160 79,160
Number of firms 46,164 45,232 40,948 24,578 22,606 22,606
Notes: OLS regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods on industry  tariffs, 
the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. Time trends are 
 two-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses.
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS)
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very similar to our baseline results from Table 4. When we use domestic services rev-
enues as our dependent variable in Table 11 (columns 3–4), we obtain slightly larger 
coefficient estimates in absolute terms on our manufacturing import tariff regressor, 
but otherwise the pattern of results is very similar to the one presented in Table 5. A 
possible explanation for these similarities is that services exports accounted for only 
a relatively small fraction of total manufacturing services revenues over our sample 
period (19 percent on average).
Different Samples of the Data.—As noted in Section IA the ARD dataset consists 
of the universe of large firms and a sample of small and medium sized firms (those 
with fewer than 100 or 250 employees depending on the year). As a result, some 
firms are in our dataset for only a brief period (often only a single year) while others 
are in the dataset in all years (large firms who entered prior to our period and did 
not exit during it). In this subsection, we simply repeat our baseline specification 
( equation (1), estimates reported in Table 4), but estimate the regressions across a 
sample of firms with at least six years tenure in our dataset, and then across a  sample 
of firms with at most five years tenure.40 We relegate these results to the online 
40 These tenure lengths were chosen as the midpoint of the ranges of tenures in our data (1 to 11 years). In 
unreported results, we repeat the analysis for different tenure length cases, and these are available on request. The 
results are consistently similar across samples. 
Table 10—Baseline Robustness—Import Penetration
Ratio of service/goods revenue
Variables (1) (2)
Import penetration 1.429 1.431
(0.724) (0.724)
Goods export tariffs − 0.148 − 0.149
(0.064) (0.064)
Services export barriers 0.006 0.005
(0.237) (0.237)
Services import barriers − 0.419 − 0.424
(0.673) (0.675)
log(labor productivity) − 0.406 − 0.406
(0.306) (0.306)
log(wage) 0.842 0.842
(0.356) (0.356)
Year FEs Yes No
Industry FEs No No
Firm FEs Yes No
Time trends No Yes
Observations 31,573 31,573
Number of firms 8,213 8,213
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from 
goods on goods import penetration, industry tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and the log 
average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. Time trends are two-digit UK SIC indus-
try time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses.
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services 
Inquiry (ITIS)
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Appendix (Table A4), but note that the estimates are virtually unchanged  compared 
to the baseline results on the full sample. We conclude that there is  nothing in 
 particular about our sample of firms that is driving the results.
Goods Tariffs–Trade Impact and Exogeneity.—We now discuss two issues related 
to our use of goods import tariffs as our main regressor. First, a necessary condi-
tion for all the mechanisms we discuss in Section II is that import tariff reductions 
increased import competition. A simple regression of imports and import penetra-
tion ratios on goods import tariffs confirms that goods tariff reductions did indeed 
lead to significant increases in imports and import penetration ratios (see Table A5 
in the online Appendix). Specifically, a 1 percentage point reduction in MFN tariffs 
led to a 9.4 percent increase in total UK goods imports and a 4.34 percentage point 
increase in the UK’s import penetration ratio.
Second, as discussed in Section IB, we believe that import tariff reductions were 
largely exogenous given the institutional setting within which they were  negotiated. 
Here, we provide additional evidence that individual UK firms and sectors did not 
influence WTO tariff negotiations in a way that is systematically related to their  current 
outcomes (e.g., struggling UK firms may make efforts to maintain high  tariffs). In 
Table 12, we present the results of industry-level regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the change in industry tariffs between 1997 and 2007 and the regressors are 
the industry growth rates of average wages, employment and sales in the pre-period, 
1992 to 1996. In other words, we ask whether observed tariff  variation is predicted by 
Table 11—Using Domestic Services Revenues in the Construction of the Revenue Ratio
Ratio of service/goods revenue Domestic services revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods import tariffs − 0.248 − 0.253 − 0.085 − 0.087
(0.078) (0.079) (0.027) (0.025)
Goods export tariffs − 0.129 − 0.126 − 0.092 − 0.092
(0.080) (0.081) (0.061) (0.065)
Services export barriers 0.113 0.167 − 0.028 − 0.006
(0.233) (0.169) (0.168) (0.166)
Services import barriers − 0.349 − 0.889 − 0.111 − 0.218
(0.798) (0.807) (0.398) (0.534)
log(labor productivity) − 0.172 − 0.171 0.016 0.016
(0.231) (0.231) (0.123) (0.122)
log(average wage) 0.981 0.992 0.310 0.308
(0.382) (0.383) (0.128) (0.133)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 44,883 44,883 46,303 46,303
Number of firms 11,132 11,132 11,425 11,425
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from domestic services and revenues from goods on indus-
try tariffs, the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. Time trends 
are two-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses.
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS)
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lagged industry outcomes. Table 12 suggests that these variables have no predictive 
power. Thus, to the extent that industry outcomes reflect the  experience of the firms 
within those industries that are most likely to engage in lobbying, these results  suggest 
no relationship between the outcomes of those firms and future  tariff changes. We 
acknowledge that some endogeneity concerns might remain,  however. If UK policy 
makers based their negotiating position on expectations about the future performance 
of UK industries, and if these expectations influenced the EU’s  negotiating position 
and led to changes in the outcome of multilateral tariff  negotiations in the WTO, 
tariffs could be correlated with other contemporaneous forces that also shape the 
transition of manufacturing from goods to services.
Attrition and the Role of Firm Exit.—The main determinant of firms’ 
 disappearance from our dataset is the sampling design of the ARD, which only 
 surveys a randomly chosen sample of smaller firms in a given year. By construction, 
this form of sample attrition is random and will not be related to trade liberalization. 
However, firms will also drop out of the sample if they go bankrupt and exit the 
market. This could  potentially explain our results if firms that produce relatively 
little service output (i.e., are primarily, or solely, goods producers) are driven out of 
the market due to trade liberalization. In this sense, the results may, in part, reflect a 
change in the  composition of firms in the market rather than simply an on-average, 
 within-firm shift toward services. In Table 13, we report the results of a standard 
attrition  probability regression in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator 
for whether a firm exits the sample due to closure at some point during the period 
1997–2007.41 The regressors are the average annual change in import tariffs faced by 
41 We use the Business Structure Database (BSD) to construct this exit indicator. The BSD is constructed from 
snapshots of the UK’s business registry and essentially contains the universe of incorporated firms. Given that the 
ARD sample is drawn from the BSD, we can link the exit indicator to our regression sample. The indicator takes 
the value of one if employment reported in the BSD drops to zero or if the firm disappears from the BSD at some 
point during the period 1997–2007. 
Table 12—Tariffs and Industry Characteristics 
 Δ Goods import tariffs
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Δ Average wage −0.021 −0.017
(0.024) (0.024)
 Δ Employment 0.000 0.008
(0.004) (0.007)
 Δ Sales −0.004 −0.009
(0.004) (0.006)
Constant −0.533 − 0.520 − 0.518 − 0.526
(0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Observations 225 225 225 225
R2 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.014
Notes: Industry-level regressions in which the dependent variable ( Δ Goods import tariffs) 
is the change in industry tariffs between 1997 and 2007, and the regressors are the industry 
growth rates of average wages, employment, and sales in the pre-period, 1992 to 1996.
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the firm over the firm’s tenure (which could be fewer than the maximum 11 years), 
the firm’s  initial goods-to-services ratio, and the interaction between tariffs and the 
initial ratio. We see in Table 13 that goods import tariffs are negatively related to 
exit probabilities although that effect is not statistically significant (column 1).42 
More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is also close to zero and is 
 insignificant,  indicating that differential attrition is unlikely to explain our results. 
In columns 2–3, we also interact the three other trade barriers measures with initial 
goods-to-services ratio, again finding no evidence for differential attrition.
The Role of Offshoring.—Next, we consider evidence for one of the mechanisms 
discussed in Section II, offshoring. It is possible that the pattern observed in the 
 regression results above may be due to an increase in geographic specialization 
on the part of multinationals. In other words, in response to lower manufacturing 
import tariffs UK firms may simply be moving their goods production overseas, 
42 At first sight, this seems to contradict previous findings in the literature that trade liberalization increases exit 
probabilities. We note, however, that our estimate is close to statistical significance ( p-value of 0.2) and is of eco-
nomically significant magnitude (a 1 percentage point reduction in import tariffs increases the likelihood of exit by 
around 4 –5 percentage points). One explanation of the lack of statistical significance might be measurement error 
in the dependent variable (the exit indicator). As discussed by Criscuolo, Haskel, and Martin (2003), the underlying 
firm registry data (the BSD) does not continuously update employment information for many of the smaller firms 
so that firms that exit are sometimes still listed as having positive employment. 
Table 13—Firm Attrition and Tariffs
Exiter = 1
Variables (1) (2) (3)
 Δ Goods import tariffs −0.039 −0.045 −0.048
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039)
Initial service/goods revenue −0.002 −0.015 −0.030
(0.004) (0.019) (0.030)
 Δ Goods import tariff × initial service/goods revenue −0.005 −0.013 −0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
 Δ Services import barriers − 0.193 − 0.219
(0.086) (0.090)
 Δ Services import barriers × initial service/goods revenue −0.131 −0.224
(0.203) (0.300)
 Δ Goods export tariffs 0.016
(0.045)
 Δ Goods export tariff × initial service/goods revenue −0.028
(0.027)
 Δ Services export barriers −0.002
(0.001)
 Δ Services export barriers × initial service/goods revenue 0.003
(0.008)
Observations 40,732 40,317 38,827
R2 0.000 0.001 0.002
Notes: Dependent variable (Exiter = 1) is  1 if the firm exits the BSD (employment falls to zero) at some point 
during the period 1997 to 2007. The firm can enter at any point. Independent change variables (denoted  Δ ) are aver-
age annual changes over the lifetime of the firm (could be fewer than 11 years). Standard errors are clustered at the 
industry level and are in parentheses.
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i.e.,  offshoring goods production while increasing their focus on the provision of 
 headquarters  services. Relatedly, Bernard and Fort (2013) note the prevalence of 
 factoryless  manufacturing firms in the United States, which they find primarily 
 consist of firms that focus their activities on goods design while also  coordinating 
the  manufacture and assembly of products in (often) overseas locations. It is 
 therefore possible that we are simply observing a trend toward more factoryless 
firms in the United Kingdom. It is important to note that these two phenomena may 
be  distinct; whereas offshoring typically denotes the movement of  intermediates 
production to overseas locations, factoryless firms are typically importing final 
goods from  overseas. We therefore take two approaches in our exploration of 
this issue, described below. We also note that the possibility of either phenomena 
 occurring does not undermine the goal of the paper, which is simply to estimate 
the relationship between goods trade liberalization and increased services provision 
on the part of UK firms, independent of the firm’s motivations for the transition. It 
does, however, potentially add nuance to the story, as it addresses whether firms are 
simply ceasing goods  production in the face of competition, or are relocating goods 
production.
First, we can directly test for increased provision of headquarter services by sim-
ply repeating regression (1); but, rather than using domestic services revenues as the 
dependent variable, we instead use the value of firms’ exports of services to affili-
ated foreign entreprises. This value is independently recorded as a unique service 
type within the ITIS dataset, and should be associated with increasing production 
fragmentation within the firm. That is, if firms do indeed respond to goods trade 
liberalization by focusing their domestic activities on the provision of headquarters 
services, we should observe a positive correlation between import tariff reductions 
and services exports to affiliated entreprises (our proxy for headquarters service 
provision)43 Table 14 shows that there is no evidence for this hypothesis goods tariff 
reductions actually seem to reduce exports of affiliate services although the coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant.44
As a further test of the specific role of offshoring (i.e., trade in intermediates), 
we add controls for intermediate input tariffs in our estimation of equation (1). 
(See Section IB for a description of the construction of these tariffs.) Intuitively, 
if UK manufacturing firms offshore manufacturing input production and re-import 
 intermediate inputs, the shift out of domestic goods production and into services 
should be made easier by lower tariffs on intermediates because this reduces the 
cost of importing intermediates. Results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 14, 
where we find that the main results are virtually unchanged when these  controls 
43 We construct exports of affiliate services by matching our regression sample (which is from the ARD) to the 
International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). If a firm cannot be matched and reports zero services exports or zero 
services production in the ARD, we set affiliate exports for that firm to zero. There are also a few firms that report 
positive services exports in the ARD but cannot be matched to the ITIS; we drop these from our sample. (Results 
are similar if we set affiliate services exports for such firms to zero instead of dropping them.) 
44 In unreported results, we also estimated our most basic specification, which only includes year fixed effects 
and the two import barrier variables (similar to column 1 of Table 4). Here, the coefficient on manufacturing import 
tariffs was indeed negative and significant, although its magnitude was only around one-fourth of the effect of 
import tariffs on total services sales. Once we include additional control variables and more restrictive sets of fixed 
effects, however, the import tariff regressor becomes insignificant. 
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are included. Furthermore, the coefficient on intermediate input tariffs is  negative, as 
expected, but statistically insignificant.45 We conclude that a shift toward increased 
relative provision of headquarters services in response to trade liberalization is 
unlikely to have played a major role over our sample period.46
C. Determinants of Firms’ Response to Trade Liberalization
We next estimate specification (2) in which relative firm-level service-to-goods 
revenues are still the dependent variable, but goods import tariffs are now interacted 
45 One explanation for this negative finding is that reduced intermediate input tariffs also have the additional 
effect of making intermediates imported from outside the firm’s boundaries cheaper, hence, lowering production 
cost. If this cost-reducing effect is stronger for goods than service production, lower input tariffs will induce a rel-
ative shift toward good production, partially offsetting the offshoring effect just discussed. Unfortunately, our data 
do not allow us to further quantify the relative importance of these two channels. 
46 In unreported results, we also implemented a version of the approach taken by Autor et al. (2014). In short, 
we explored the UK industry-level impact of Chinese import penetration, where we instrumented for Chinese 
import penetration with import penetration in non-UK high-income countries over our period, 1997–2007. We find 
results consistent with those reported here—i.e., relatively greater Chinese import penetration is associated with a 
relatively larger shift toward services across UK industries. These results are available upon request. 
Table 14—Exports of Headquarters Services and Intermediate Inputs 
Exported HQ services Ratio of service/goods revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods import tariffs 0.065 0.075 − 0.211 − 0.221
(0.048) (0.047) (0.064) (0.066)
Goods input tariffs −0.107 −0.152
(0.153) (0.164)
Goods export tariffs 0.174 0.269 −0.053 −0.053
(0.171) (0.151) (0.047) (0.047)
Services export barriers −2.319 −2.351 0.0382 0.123
(3.248) (3.502) (0.087) (0.094)
Services import barriers −0.718 −0.454 −0.187 −0.845
(1.070) (1.007) (1.028) (1.244)
log(labor productivity) − 0.437 − 0.412 −0.277 −0.274
(0.156) (0.161) (0.227) (0.226)
log(average wage) − 0.806 − 0.791 0.959 0.956
(0.346) (0.346) (0.359) (0.359)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,020 2,020 54,905 54,905
Number of firms 339 339 14,284 14,284
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods on industry  tariffs, 
the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. The sharp drop in 
the number of observations is due to the fact that firms that never export headquarter services are dropped from the 
sample as they do not contribute to the fixed-effect Poisson likelihood function (also see footnote 33). Time trends 
are two-digit UK SIC industry time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses.
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS)
VOL. 10 NO. 4 105BREINLICH ET AL.: FROM SELLING GOODS TO SELLING SERVICES
with additional regressors, i.e., we allow for firm heterogeneity in the response to 
trade liberalization. As discussed, the aim of this exercise is to provide evidence 
for or against the mechanisms discussion in Section II. Table 15 reports the results. 
Column 1 includes interaction terms between goods import tariffs and initial R&D 
stocks (normalized by firm sales), initial physical capital stocks (also normalized by 
firm sales), and the initial firm average wage, respectively.47 In column 2, we use 
labor productivity instead of wages as a proxy for the  skill-intensity of production 
and in column 3 we include both.48 In column 4, we further control for the initial 
47 We note that when we include R&D stocks our sample shifts toward R&D-intensive firms due to the fact that 
our source for the R&D information, the BERD, samples firms that are relatively likely to engage in R&D. 
48 As discussed previously, labor productivity might also play a role if the transition into services production 
requires a fixed cost investment. This investment would only be profitable for more productive firms, and we should 
observe a stronger shift into services for such firms in response to the tariff reductions. 
Table 15—Interaction Regressions and Beginning-of-Period Firm-Level Covariates 
Ratio of service/goods revenue
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Goods import tariffs −0.139 −0.198 −0.178 −0.184 −0.148
(0.244) (0.307) (0.317) (0.341) (0.348)
Goods export tariffs −0.080 −0.082 −0.081 −0.081 −0.077
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
Services export barriers 0.129 0.128 0.128 0.129 0.141
(0.156) (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157)
Services import barriers 1.242 1.253 1.240 1.228 0.963
(0.792) (0.795) (0.792) (0.764) (0.744)
Goods import tariff × initial R&D − 0.110 −0.114 −0.111 − 0.112 −0.102
(0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.060) (0.058)
Goods import tariff × initial capital investment 0.072 0.074 0.072 0.073 0.066
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Goods import tariff × log(initial labor productivity) 0.039 0.028 0.027 0.020
(0.035) (0.055) (0.056) (0.053)
Goods import tariff × log(initial average wage) 0.063 0.025 0.028 0.027
(0.064) (0.110) (0.117) (0.115)
Goods import tariff × initial service revenue −0.010 −0.009
(0.081) (0.079)
log(average wage) 0.311 0.297 0.305 0.303 0.293
(0.394) (0.386) (0.392) (0.387) (0.384)
log(labor productivity) 0.578 0.585 0.581 0.580 0.579
(0.171) (0.172) (0.176) (0.172) (0.172)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs No No No No No
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trends No No No No Yes
Observations 7,151 7,151 7,151 7,151 7,151
Number of firms 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322
Notes: PPML regressions of the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods on industry  tariffs, 
the log of firm productivity, and the log average wage. FE indicates fixed effects in the model. Time trends are two-
digit UK SIC industry time trends.Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are in parentheses. 
Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS)
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share of services in total sales to account for the possibility that firms with higher 
initial service production might find the shift into services easier. Finally, column 5 
adds 2-digit industry time trends.
Firstly, the results indicate a role for R&D in promoting the firm’s response to 
trade liberalization. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statisti-
cally significant throughout and is not much affected by the inclusion of additional 
control variables. Firms with higher initial R&D stocks thus see a stronger shift 
into services relative to goods revenues as manufacturing import tariffs fall. At the 
same time, we find little impact on the transition to services from any of the other 
variables. A higher initial capital intensity is associated with a less pronounced tran-
sition, but the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. In addition, 
if we take the initial average wage as a proxy for initial skill, it is clear that the most 
low-skill-intensive firms are not necessarily the most responsive to the liberalization 
episode. This points away from the simple Heckscher-Ohlin channel discussed in 
Section II. Having also ruled out the offshoring channel above, the evidence sug-
gests a prominent role for the knowledge-intensity of the firm, as proxied by the 
R&D stock, in driving the shift toward increased relative services provision in the 
face of trade liberalization.
It therefore seems that trade liberalization in the goods market leads firms to shift 
toward increased provision of services in the face of falling import barriers, and that 
the most expertise-intensive firms are the most responsive. This evidence seems 
to favor a mechanism by which accumulated expertise allows firms to shift into 
increased service provision. We note, however, that it is also consistent with a more 
nuanced Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism in which R&D intensity itself is a source of 
comparative advantage.49
V. Concluding Remarks
In the face of trade liberalization, domestic firms are often forced out of the mar-
ket, whereas others adapt and survive. In this paper, we have focused on a new chan-
nel of adaptation, namely the shift toward increased provision of services in lieu of 
goods production. Using firm-level data for the United Kingdom over the period 
1997–2007, we have explored the link between lower manufacturing import tariffs 
and the firm’s tradeoff between goods production and the provision of services, find-
ing that lower import tariffs on goods caused firms to shift into services provision, 
and out of goods production. The magnitude of our results is highly significant, both 
statistically and economically.50
We also examined the factors influencing the extent of the transition into services. 
We found that a firm’s initial stock of R&D is strongly associated with a successful 
transition, while the average skill level of the firm (as proxied by average wages), 
its productivity, its capital stock, and initial level of service production play little 
49 In addition, to the extent that our proxy for skill is imprecise, our R&D variable may also be picking up 
additional variation in skill across firms. 
50 As a comparison to somewhat related work, Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond (2013) explores the 
response of multi-product firms to exchange rate shocks, finding a large response in terms of the number of products 
added in the face of an exchange rate depreciation. 
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direct role. While we interpret this as evidence that a firm’s accumulated expertise 
may be a key asset in surviving import competition, we note that this does not rule 
out a more nuanced Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism in which R&D intensity itself is a 
source of comparative advantage.
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